Investigation 21 Global Population Trends Answer Key.zip
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The World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, published by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, provides a comprehensive review of global demographic trends and prospects for the future. The information is essential to guide policies aimed at achieving the new Sustainable Development Goals.
The new projections include some notable findings at the country level. China (with 1.4 billion inhabitants) and India (1.3 billion inhabitants) remain the two most populous countries, comprising 19 and 18% of the total global population. In roughly seven years, or around 2024, the population of India is expected to surpass that of China.
The 2017 Revision builds on previous revisions by incorporating additional results from the 2010 and 2020 rounds of national population censuses as well as findings from recent specialized sample surveys from around the world. The 2017 Revision provides a comprehensive set of demographic data and indicators that can be used to assess population trends at the global, regional and national levels and to calculate other key indicators for monitoring progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals.
The global demographic transition began in the nineteenth century in the now economically developed parts of the world (the North) with declines in death rates. Large reductions in birth rates followed in the early part of the twentieth century. These transitions are now more or less complete. But, as shown in table 1, trends for the two principal regions in the North are expected to diverge between 2005 and 2050: an increase from 0.33 to 0.45 billion in Northern America, and a decline from 0.73 to 0.66 billion in Europe. In fact, several countries in Europe (e.g. Russia) and East Asia (e.g. Japan) face significant population declines as birth rates have fallen below death rates.
The composition of a population as determined by the number or proportion of males and females in each age category. The age-sex structure of a population is the cumulative result of past trends in fertility, mortality, and migration. Information on age-sex composition is essential for the description and analysis of many other types of demographic data.
The composition of a population as determined by the number or proportion of males and females in each age category. The age-sex structure of a population is the cumulative result of past trends in fertility, mortality, and migration. Information on age-sex composition is essential for the description and analysis of many types of demographic data.
Global Burden of Disease The Global Burden of Disease study provides the most comprehensive global health estimates, examining worldwide, national, and regional trends for mortality and morbidity from major diseases, injuries, and risk factors to understand the health challenges of the 21st century.
One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.
Once health improved and mortality declined things changed quickly. Particularly over the course of the 20th century: Over the last 100 years global population more than quadrupled. As we see in the chart, the rise of the global population got steeper and steeper and you have just lived through the steepest increase of that curve. This also means that your existence is a tiny part of the reason why that curve is so steep.
In red, you see the annual population growth rate (that is, the percentage change in population per year) of the global population. It peaked around half a century ago. Peak population growth was reached in 1968 with an annual growth of 2.1%. Since then the increase of the world population has slowed and today grows by just over 1% per year. This slowdown of population growth was not only predictable but predicted. Just as expected by demographers, the world as a whole is experiencing the closing of a massive demographic transition.
The world enters the last phase of the demographic transition and this means we will not repeat the past. The global population has quadrupled over the course of the 20th century, but it will not double anymore over the course of this century.
We are on the way to a new balance. The big global demographic transition that the world entered more than two centuries ago is then coming to an end. This new equilibrium is different from the one in the past when it was the very high mortality that kept population growth in check. In the new balance, it will be low fertility that keeps population changes small.
In 1950 there were 2.5 billion people on the planet. Now, there are more than 8 billion. By the end of the century, the UN expects a global population of around 10.4 billion. This visualization of the population pyramid makes it possible to understand this enormous global transformation.
In the entry on global population growth we are explaining how births, deaths, and migration are driving population growth. There we are also discussing the demographic transition as the central concept that explains why rapid population growth is a temporary phenomenon.
Population projections show that the yearly number of births will remain at around 130 to 140 million per year over the coming decades. It is then expected to slowly decline in the second half of the century. As the world population ages, the annual number of deaths is expected to continue to increase in the coming decades until it reaches a similar annual number as global births towards the end of the century.
As the number of births is expected to slowly fall and the number of deaths to rise, the global population growth rate will continue to fall. This is when the world population will stop increasing in the future.
Projections of the global population take into account how the fertility rate will change in each country over the coming decades. The WC-IIASA projections are particularly helpful for the discussion here as they are the only projections that break down the demographic projections by the educational level of the populations and then model how different educational scenarios would affect the fertility rate in countries across the world. This then allows comparisons of how education matters for the size and distribution of the future population of the planet.
While the differences between the educational scenarios are slow to materialize and only show up after some decades,17 they are then very substantial and matter hugely for the size of the future world population. Whether or not the world is making fast progress in making education available to more children faster will matter for the size of the global population in just a few decades.
A larger increase in the educational attainment in the short-run will mean that the size of cohorts that need investments in the long-run will be much smaller: The difference between no further improvements in the educational enrollment (CER scenario) and a continuation of the successful last decades will mean that the global population of under-15-year-olds will be half a billion smaller at the end of the century. An acceleration to the Fast Track (FT) scenario would mean that this global figure is again smaller by yet another 200 million children.
So far we have looked at the total figures for the global population. What we have not yet taken into account is how the size of the population will evolve in different regions and countries of the world.
The UN series shows that for most years from 1950 until the late 1960s women around the world had more than 5 children on average. Since then the fertility rate has halved and is now at 2.3 children per woman. The UN projects that the fertility rate will further decline to around 2 in 2070 and by the end of the century the fertility rate will fall below 2. A global fertility rate of 1.84 then would imply a decline of the global population over the long run.
Interestingly the projections for the total fertility rate under the pessimistic Constant Enrollment Rates (CER) scenario are again very similar to the UN Medium projection. Under this scenario the WC-IIASA researchers project a global fertility rate just below 2 and a fertility rate for Africa just above 2. The pessimistic scenario of WC-IIASA is similar to the UN Medium projection, and all of the more optimistic WC-IIASA scenarios imply lower fertility rates. In these optimistic scenarios, the global population is therefore significantly smaller at the end of the century, with smaller cohorts of school-age children throughout this period.
What we have seen in the different projections of future global population is that future population growth in Africa is the most influential and contentious question. What happens in Africa now and in the coming decades will determine what size and structure the global population will have at the end of the century.21
Still, living conditions in most parts of the African continent are very poor and it would be too early to say that the changes that we are seeing now are foreshadowing the improvements which will lower fertility rates more rapidly. This will be determined only in the coming years, and the quantity and quality of education will be crucial as the visualization below shows. How quickly global population growth will slow will be decided by the chance of girls to go to school and the chances they have in life afterwards.
What will be the result of these global demographic changes according to the WC-IIASA demographers The middle scenario by WC-IIASA for the educational structure of the world population is shown in this chart here. 153554b96e
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